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I. Starting at the end, in the guise of an introduction 
 
In Logical Investigations, principally in the undervalued last chapter of the Sixth 
Investigation, we find the fundamentals for a theory about the logical-semantic status of 
non-declarative sentences that express desires, questions, orders, promises, etc.1 This 
sketch of a theory responds to the questions that were raised in the very first paragraph 
of the Sixth Investigation about intentionality in general and, in particular, about the 
acts that could be »carriers« of meaning.2 
Contrary to what is commonly thought, this doctrine of non-declarative sentences, 
and of the »not-objectifying acts« (nicht-objektivierende Akte) that these sentences ex-
press, is, therefore, deeply rooted in the theoretical corpus of the Investigations. For that 
very reason, it not only has far-reaching consequences for various domains (e.g. with 
regard to the theories on language and the intentionality of conscience), but is also 
based, in turn, on a set of very well-defined assumptions. The theory about these sen-
                                                 
1
 The exact title of this last chapter is: »Non-objectifying acts as apparent fulfilments of meaning«. This 
ninth chapter is the Third Section of the Sixth Investigation, which is entitled »Clarification of our Intro-
ductory Problems«, that is, the problems in the light of which the whole Sixth Investigation is developed. 
2
 The title of the first paragraph of the Sixth Investigation is, precisely, »Whether every type of mental 
act, or only certain types, can function as carriers of meaning«. See L.U., Hua XIX/2, p. 544; English 
translation (from now on »LI«), vol. II, p. 191 ss. 
tences (Sätze) that are not statements (Aussagen), as well as about the way in which 
they are related to declarative sentences (Aussagesätze) that express statements, is, 
therefore, far from being that minor issue that decades of silence or lack of pheno-
menological work on pertinent logical-semantic issues would seem to suggest. On the 
contrary, it has an extraordinary relevance for an evaluation both of the strength and the 
inadequacies of Husserl’s theoretical positions. Indeed, Husserl himself so admits, by 
suggesting that a theory contrary to what he himself argues about non-declarative 
sentences would knock down some of the backbones that support his Investigations. 
This last chapter on the status of non-declarative sentences should, therefore, despite 
their patently flawed nature, be read, in my opinion, not as an appendix, but as truly 
completing the dome that was gradually built throughout the six investigations. The 
examination of the potential problems inherent in Husserl’s theses about the logical-
semantic status of non-declarative sentences could thus work, in retrospect, as a really 
fitting test for certain central Husserlian theories, as expounded in the Investigations. 
Expressed in Husserlian idiolect, the disputed issue concerning non-declarative 
sentences lies in knowing »[...] whether the familiar grammatical forms used in our 
speech for wishes, questions, voluntary intentions – acts, generally speaking, we do not 
class as 'objectifying' – are to be regarded as judgments concerning our acts or whether 
these acts themselves [...] can function as 'expressed' whether in a sense-giving or sense-
fulfilling fashion.«3 
Under the general designation of »non-declarative sentence«, we understand both 
an interrogative sentence type (Fragesatz), like is the cat on the mat?, or an imperative 
sentence (Befehlsatz), like go away!, or wish sentences (Wunschsätze), like good luck!, 
may the gods be with us…, or any other sentences that express acts, otherwise so differ-
ent from one another, such as to promise, threaten, advise, ask or even pray, to invoke 
the well-known example of Aristotle in Περὶ Ἑρµηνείας. In short, it is a question of 
knowing, as the first paragraph of the Sixth Investigation had already stated, if signi-
fying is only effected in acts of an objectifying nature, if only these, therefore, can be 
Bedeutungsträger, »meaning-carriers«, or if questions, volitions, orders, and any other 
acts of any kind can support the meaning function, in such a way that, let us say, a pro-
positional matter like »there is life on Mars« could be direct and immediately »carried« 
by an act of a non-objectifying quality like a question or a wish. Husserl, as he admitted, 
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 Idem, p. 737. 
although reluctantly, had long held this last position to be inevitable.  And it was pre-
cisely to finally banish it that, in the final chapter of the Sixth Investigation, the problem 
was dealt with ex professo. For, behind the seemingly minor question about the relation-
ship between non-declarative and declarative sentences, what is at issue is the major 
problem of knowing what should count as the fundamental form of intentionality, that is 
to say, what kind of acts (what »qualities«) are truly intentions aimed at something as an 
object. 
Husserl’s argument – it must be said from the outset – is that all non-objectifying 
qualities are based on underlying objectifying acts and that only these are genuinely 
sense-bestowing acts (bedeutunsverleihende Akte). His thesis, therefore, is that the 
forms that natural languages coined for questions, orders, etc. should be interpreted, 
from the logical-semantic point of view, as judgments on acts. His argument is, thus, 
that there are judgments in the expression of questions, orders, volitions, promises, etc., 
that interrogative sentences, wish sentences, imperative sentences, therefore contain 
(implicitly or explicitly – that is irrelevant for the moment) declarative sentences, and 
that it is only because there are judgments in them and because there are declarative 
sentences in them, that the expressions of questions, orders, promises, etc. can have a 
signification. So Husserl must show us how to find the objectifying act that is present in 
sentences that express questions, orders or wishes. It is precisely this that is addressed 
by the theory which Husserl puts forward in the last chapter of the Sixth Investigation. 
Both this question and Husserl’s response, though apparently sibylline, are, how-
ever, truly essential to decide on the accuracy and consistency (two different issues) of 
the foundational theses of the Investigations. In fact, this question involves things as 
essential as defining what meaning is and what are the relationships, on the one hand, 
between signifying and stating and, on the other hand, between the objectual presenta-
tion (the »intentional matter« of the act) and the belief (the positional quality of the 
»objectifying« acts), as well as understanding what essential function is, after all, en-
trusted to language: whether stating in a monological context or acting intersubjectively 
in a communicative context. In addition, it is important to know, in connection with the 
last of the questions above, what we are actually talking about when we refer, according 
to Husserl, to »qualities« such as believing, asking, wishing, ordering, promising, etc. Is 
it a question, with the inventory of these act qualities (or part of them), of providing a 
simple list of the various types of psychological lived-experiences or is it mostly a 
question of identifying basic forms of linguistic behaviour linked to social acts of com-
municative interaction? 
All these questions call for a phenomenological analysis. To go straight to my 
point, I would say: 
A) Husserl’s argument with regard to non-declarative sentences is consistent with 
his theories on (i) intentional lived-experiences (intentionale Erlebnisse), (ii) significa-
tion or meaning (Bedeutung), (iii) expression (Ausdruck) and language (Sprache), theo-
ries that were expounded, respectively, in the Fifth, First, Fourth and again in the First 
Investigations; 
B) But Husserl’s thesis has little (or even no) accuracy with regard to an examina-
tion of the intentional and semantic status of non-declarative sentences, distorting, for 
this reason, the content of phenomenologically describable sense of acts like asking, 
wanting, ordering, promising, etc. The analysis of Husserl becomes, therefore, phe-
nomenologically inadequate. Hence, we can say that there is also something wrong, in 
whole or in part, with the abovementioned theories, in A (i), (ii) and (iii). 
When we want to determine what it is that is wrong with these theories and there-
fore examine alternative logical-semantic points of view, we find, surprisingly or maybe 
not, in a theorist of common language an insightful criticism of two major illusions that 
affect these analyses of Husserl. First, the assertive illusion, according to which lan-
guage is mainly used to describe reality through positional or thetic acts; second, the 
truth-value illusion, according to which the essential core of sentences consists of a pro-
positional structure whose content is always liable to be evaluated as true or false de-
pending on the sheer meaning of the words involved. These two illusions are tenacious 
(and it would still be necessary to explain why they come about). In the light of the first, 
the use of language aims to describe reality, rather than being itself an act of construct-
ing (intersubjective, social) reality. In the light of the second, non-declarative sentences 
are imperfect language realisation forms, precisely because they lack this supposed fun-
damental relationship with truth – as if truth-evaluation was the favoured way of using 
language and the essential way of making sense. When I mention this famous criticism 
of this double »constative« and »truth-value« illusion, I refer, of course, to the theory 
that John Austin expounded in 1955 about »performatives« and illocutionary acts in the 
William James Lectures at Harvard University, which were published in 1962 in How to 
do Things with Words.4 
To conclude this overall announcement of my theme, I would say that I do not 
want to set Austin against Husserl or correct one or the other, but rather use the most 
important insights in both of them to outline a phenomenological theory on social acts 
and communication. This theory was initiated by Reinach in 1913,5 but is, to this day, 
still largely unconstructed. Only it can bring to the surface, however, what is, in my 
opinion, the element in which the question of linguistic behaviour like asking, wishing, 
ordering, but also stating, should be described from the phenomenological point of 
view: the phenomenon of communication. In fact, although the phenomenon of com-
munication has ante- or pre-linguistic roots and is wider than language (strictly 
speaking, not all communication is linguistic, neither does all language serve a 
communicative purpose), qualities of act such as questions, orders, promises, which are 
expressed in interrogative, imperative or promissive sentences, are, typically, uses of 
language with a communicative purpose. That is, in sharp contrast to Husserl in the 
Investigations, the point of departure for a theory of language is not pure Logic and the 
ideality of meaning, but the production of meaning in a definite communicational 
context. The shortcomings of some of Husserl’s arguments may be interpreted 
retrospectively as so many consequences of the set of abstractions and amputations that 
the phenomenon of language must undergo so that, in it, something like the field of 
Logic, i.e. pure Bedeutung, can be isolated as an ideal-identical unit regardless of any speaker 
or any utterance context. The attempt to isolate what is said as such (das Gesagte als 
solches), regardless of who says it, to whom and why it is said, and the context in which 
it is said, is, at the same time, the greatness and greatest limitation of Husserlian 
analyses in the Logical Investigations. 
Indeed, Husserl himself so suggests, in his comments of 1913 on the Fourth In-
vestigation, when he says that the proper name for the theory that he ended up develop-
ing there is Pure Logical Grammar, precisely because it still lacks »relations of mutual 
understanding among minded persons« which is a »peculiar a priori«.6 It is not, cer-
tainly, a question of complementing the Pure Logical Grammar with a Psychology. It is, 
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 See J. Austin, How to do Things with Words, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1976, for example, p.  3, 
on the »descriptive fallacy«, or p. 12, on the assumption that to say is always (or in cases that are worth 
considering) to state something, or p. 151, on the »true/false fetish«. 
5
 See Adolf Reinach, »Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechtes«, in: Jahrbuch für Philo-
sophie und phänomenologische Forschung 1: 685-847. 
6
 L.U. Hua XIX/1, pp. 348-349. 
rather, a question of developing the communicative dimension of meaning alongside the 
theory of forms of composition and the laws of transformation of significations. The 
awkward question (for Husserl) is to know whether this »communicative« a priori will 
not, in turn, interfere with the »signifying« a priori in such a way that would make it 
impossible to treat one without the other within a Logical Grammar which, henceforth, 
would no longer be also »pure«. 
 
 
II. Three assumptions… 
 
I said above that Husserl’s theory was consistent, but not accurate. The essential 
issue of accuracy will be addressed later. What I want to show for now is its consis-
tency. This will become visible as soon as we understand how Husserl’s theory on non-
declarative sentences follows directly from his more general tenets about intentionality, 
signification and language, expounded in the First, Fourth and Fifth Investigations. As a 
matter of fact, these three general Husserlian doctrines, which form the theoretical 
framework of the Investigations, contain the major assumptions which drive the whole 
analysis of the linguistic forms in question. I would like to consider them, therefore, 
before discussing the Husserlian theory on non-declarative sentences in more detail. 
They are as follows: 
A – Regarding intentionality, the equivalence between intentional and objectifying 
acts; 
B – Regarding signification, the independence of the meaning function; 
C – Finally, the statement (Aussage) as the basic form of language. 
 
A – As is well known, at the beginning of the Fifth Investigation Husserl presents 
three concepts of consciousness (Bewußtsein). All three of these concepts refer directly 
to the concept of lived-experience (Erlebnis). The idea of the totality of lived-experi-
ences produces the first concept of consciousness: consciousness as the full set of lived-
experiences belonging to the self, i.e. the flow of consciousness (Bewußtseinsfluss, -
strom). Self-perception of lived-experiences produces the second concept of conscious-
ness: consciousness as inner perception (innere Wahrnehmung). Finally, the lived-ex-
perience as an unreal relation to something that »inexists« (Brentano’s expression) in it 
as object, i.e. lived-experience as consciousness-of, yields the third concept of con-
science: consciousness as psychic act or intentional lived-experience (psychische Akt, 
intentionale Erlebnis). 
Husserl would later have sophisticated theories to offer with respect to the first 
and second concepts of consciousness. Consciousness as totality is effected in the form 
of a consciousness of the three dimensions of time, with its open horizons (therefore, 
not totalisable) of past and future. Inner perception, or pre-reflexive consciousness of 
oneself (in the Investigations, Husserl simply criticises Brentano’s theory, because it 
allegedly implies a regressus in infinitum), takes the form of »longitudinal« intentional-
ity of the »absolute consciousness«, by which, in the connection between proto-impres-
sion and retention, a self-giveness of the flow takes place. 
All this, as I said, will be the subject matter of future phenomenological analyses. 
In the Fifth Investigation, however, the emphasis is on the third meaning: consciousness 
as consciousness-of (something). Regarding the particular feature of consciousness put 
forward by the third meaning, Husserl’s thesis is that this unreal relation to something, 
intentionality, assumes, at its very root, the form of positional acts (setzende Akte), with 
the related neutrality modifications. 
This is a crucial point. Intentional matter is the apprehension-sense (Auffas-
sungssinn), which »makes objective« (vorstellig macht) in the broadest sense. But mat-
ter is not an act, it is only an element in an act, and this act falls under a particular qua-
litative kind (under a Qualität). Therefore, considering that there is no intentionality 
without this basic function of making objective (vorstellig machen), because it is pre-
cisely in it that the relation to something is shaped, i.e. the consciousness-of, the ques-
tion is whether this function, which pertains to »matter« (the intentionale Materie), 
could be »supported« by acts of any kind (in other words: performed in any kind of act), 
or if it requires acts of a specific quality. The question, therefore, is whether the act in 
which something is presented could or could not be, arbitrarily, a volitive act, a wish 
act, or any other act, and if not, what kind of act will be then required by the intentional 
matter. 
Husserl’s thesis is that intentional matter does require acts of a well-determined 
quality, namely, acts of a positional type, acts of belief (and their modifications) in the 
objectivity intended to. In a nominal matter, e.g. the defeated at Waterloo, an object is 
presented in a single-rayed act; in a propositional matter, e.g. the defeated at Waterloo 
was born in Corsica, a state of affairs is intended in a many-rayed act. But intentionality 
is not just this presentation, it is rather the thetic belief that what the name names exists, 
or the synthetic belief that the state of affairs that the proposition describes really takes 
place. This is what Husserl calls an act of objectifying quality (for short, an »objectify-
ing act«, Objektivierender Akt). Intentionality basically entails an act of belief, it is 
»doxical« in character, for the simple reason that to present something in a certain way 
(through the intentional matter) implies a belief or is closely connected to a belief that 
assumes the »reality« in a broad sense, i.e. the effective, probable, possible or even im-
possible being of the presented object. Normally, the object presented is posited as ex-
isting and this position may even be expressed in an explicit way in an act of modified 
matter, like, for instance, in the judgment »the defeated at Waterloo exists« or in the 
name »the existing defeated at Waterloo«. Normally, however, this positionality imbri-
cates on the matter itself of the intentional act, and can only be separated by means of 
analysis – matter and objectifying quality are, therefore, two non-self-sufficient parts 
(two »moments«) of the same whole. The fundamental form of intentional acts is, there-
fore, that of objectifying acts. It is them that primarily relate to nominal and proposi-
tional matters, which present objects. Therefore, presentation (Vorstellung, in the par-
ticular sense of »matter«) and position go hand in hand – they form what is called a 
judgment (Urteil). 
This intentional consciousness that comes into play in the canonical form of belief 
can be neutralised, of course, moved to its counterpart (Gegenstük) of the »mere pres-
entation« (bloße Vorstellung), that leaves its object »in suspension«, so to speak. But 
consciousness never comes into play as sheer presentation of an object (as an isolated 
matter, without positional quality) or as a »mere presentation«, relative to which an act 
of acceptance or rejection would come to relate afterwards (as in Brentano’s theory of 
double judgment). A thetic element is always associated with the object-presentation, 
even if it is not part of the semantic and syntactic content of the proposition itself (ex-
cept in a tournure de phrase like »the existing postman hurrying by«). In short, all con-
sciousness, in the third meaning, is a presentative and positional consciousness of 
something – matter and quality belong to the intentional essence of acts. Consciousness 
of something is, therefore, at its very root, an act of objectifying quality. 
This is the first assumption – the identification between intentional consciousness 
and acts of a certain quality, namely, those that take-to-be-true (für-wahrhalten) what is 
presented in an intentional matter or that, on the contrary, are apositional and modify the 
positionality in a mere, neutral »leaving-in-suspension« (dahinstellen). This theory that 
intentionality is based on positional acts and on their corresponding non-positional 
modifications is, as everyone knows, the last interpretation of Brentano’s famous dictum 
that Husserl offers in the Fifth Investigation: every act is either a presentation (a Vor-
stellung, now interpreted as an act of objectifying quality, of nominal or propositional 
matter) or is based on such a presentation.7 Intentionality is, in its nucleus, the position 
of being or its correlative suspension (it will always, therefore, be a »being-intention« – 
a Seinsmeinung, as Husserl says in § 38 of the Fifth Logical Investigation). Hence, all 
the other qualities, however diverse they might be, insofar as they refer to an object 
through an intentional matter, are interconnected and can be taken as a whole, in the 
precise extent to which they all require an act of objectifying quality as their base. In-
versely, no objectifying act requires a non-objectifying quality built on it. 
From here, Husserl gets an important theorem of his doctrine of intentionality: that 
of the »founding of non-objectifying acts such as joys, wishes, volitions on objectifying 
acts (presentations, acts of taken-to-be-true): here an act-quality has its primary founda-
tion in another act-quality, and is only mediately founded on 'matter'.«8 Thus, joy 
presupposes the conviction that the state-of-affairs that causes us joy exists, but the po-
sition of the state-of-affairs as existing (the objectifying act) does not require one more 
act of joy or sadness based on it. The objectifying act is therefore the carrier (Träger) of 
matter – if an object (lato sensu) is »presented« by matter, it is now settled that the pri-
mary intentional act is the being-assumption (correlative: the being-neutralization) of 
this presented object. 
This theory is plausible, but it requires more differentiation. A wish, for example, 
implies a positional consciousness that is a thesis not of being or not-being, but rather of 
possibility. A promise implies an objectifying act that places its object as probable, etc. 
The Ideas I, of 1913, would introduce this higher sophistication in the doxic forms, 
abandoning the polarity of the Investigations between the position of being and its 
»neutralisation« (the simple understanding, without position-taking).9 
It is in the light of this thesis that the founding form of intentional acts is that of 
objectifying acts, of both nominal and propositional matter, that all sentences that do not 
express statements and that are not, therefore, declarative sentences could be grouped, 
despite their variety. What, in fact, do wishful, exclamatory, interrogative and impera-
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 See L.U., Hua XIX/1, 5th Investigation, § 41, p. 514. 
8
 L.U., Hua XIX/1, p. 519. 
9
 See, for example, L.U., Hua XIX/1, p. 507 and Ideen, Hua III/1, pp. 271-272. In this work, acts in the 
sphere of will and feeling are also taken as potentially »objectifying« acts, with their own form of posi-
tionality, which ultimately refers to acts in the doxic sphere, which perform a current objectification. 
According to Husserl, this enshrines the privilege of the »logical« stratum of intentionality. 
tive sentences have in common? The answer goes as follows: they have in common the 
fact of not being, none of them, declarative sentences that express acts of an objectify-
ing quality and, therefore, of being based on objectifying acts which provide their foun-
dation, or include such objectifying acts so that they can have a meaning. 
These two formulations – to be based upon and to include – are not, however, 
equivalent, and, as we shall see, conceal an ambiguity in Husserl’s thesis. Nevertheless, 
Husserl’s rejoinder is, apparently, a good response. The critic of this appearance will be 
dealt with later. 
 
B – For now, let us move on to the second assumption: the independence of the 
meaning function. Any reader familiar with the Investigations knows of Husserl’s long 
effort to dissociate the meaning-bestowing act (bedeutungsverleihender Akt – for the 
sake of brevity, we will call it the »signifying act«) from the meaning-fulfilling act (be-
deutungserfüllender Akt) and from the act of intimating the signifying intention 
(kundgebender Akt). In short, every reader of the Investigations knows the efforts 
Husserl went to separate the meaning function from the communicative function of lan-
guage and, once more, to separate the signifying act from the cognitive act. For him, to 
mean, to know and to communicate are, indeed, different things. 
The connection of the signifying act with concomitant intuitions is lessened in two 
ways. First, a parte ante, Husserl insists (and he is right, in my view) that the accompa-
nying images do not perform any essential role in the formation of the meaning-inten-
tion10 – so, to understand the expressions »horse«, »square root« or »prime number«, 
the inadequate and fleeting images, that may perhaps be produced, form no part of, nor 
do they fix the meaning of the expressions. In brief: there is understanding without 
intuition of images, and meaning does not depend at all on any kind of image formation. 
Secondly, a parte post, this meaning-intention, in which an object is intended »in the 
void«, has a fulfilling relationship with the intuition of the corresponding object (the 
fulfilling-sense), but the intuition that fulfils the meaning-intention does not prolong or 
complete it, as if only intuition could endow it with its object. Endowing the intention 
with an object is performed by the meaning function alone, and to endow with an object 
(the gegenständliche Beziehung) is not to give the object. As a matter of fact, the give-
ness rather goes from the act that intends the object by means of the meaning-function 
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 See L.U. Hua XIX/1, pp. 67 et seq. 
to the act that (re)cognises this intuited object as being precisely that which had been 
intended (or which produces a corresponding »deception«, Täuschung). The fulfilment 
of the meaning-intention by the corresponding intuition is what Husserl calls the cogni-
tional act (Erkenntnisakt). But cognizing is not essential for the signifying act, which 
already has an object (related to the Bedeutung), regardless of any extending of the 
meaning-intention into the corresponding intuition. The latter will rather have the func-
tion either of reinforcing or confirming the positional quality of the signifying act. To 
this extent, to signify and to cognize are, therefore, different things.11  And the meaning 
function is more fundamental than the cognizing function – in general, we can mean 
without cognizing. 
The same dissociation is made for the intimating function (kundgebende Funk-
tion). All expression has a meaning and refers, through it, to an object. To use a mea-
ningful expression and to refer, through its content, to an object is the very essence of 
the signifying act. In addition, to use a meaningful expression also implies, by force of 
the utterance act (Äusserung), to make manifest to another person that the one uttering 
has such and such a lived-experience, in which he or she intends such and such an ob-
ject and even, possibly, that he or she is speaking to that other. However, as the famous 
example of the inner monologue in the »soul’s solitary life« shows,12 when we talk with 
ourselves, this intimating function of the linguistic sign disappears, the audible word is 
reduced to the simple fantasy of a possible verbal sound (Wortlaut) but, nevertheless, 
we still continue to signify, albeit without communicating anything to anybody. In a 
word, as with cognition, to mean is more basic than to communicate – we can mean 
without communicating. 
Husserl’s argument therefore boils down to the following: firstly, the dissociation 
between the meaning, the cognitive and the communicative functions; secondly, the 
assertion that the meaning function is entirely independent from the other two, whereas, 
inversely, we cannot communicate (content) or cognize (an object) without the media-
tion of the meaning function (more precisely, without the mediation of sense-bestowing 
acts). 
However, it may be argued, pace Husserl, against this independence of the mean-
ing function, that in certain important linguistic expressions, (i) the meaning is only de-
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 See L.U., Hua XIX/1, p. 44. 
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 See L.U., Hua XIX/1, pp. 41-43 (§ 8). 
termined by reference to an intuition or (ii) the meaning is only completed by its inser-
tion into a communicative context. 
The first instance is provided by deictics – this, that, etc.; by personal pronouns – 
I, you, etc.; and by adverbs of time and place – today, here, now, etc., i.e. by what 
Husserl himself, in the First Investigation, calls »essentially subjective« or »occasional 
expressions«.13 In all these instances, the full understanding of meaning requires a refer-
ence to the current perception of the act of utterance so that the hearer can determine in 
particular to what expressions like this, today or I refer. In order to sustain the complete 
independence of the meaning function, Husserl perpetrates a true act of violence14 in the 
Investigations, stating that, ideally, from the point of view of a perfect language, every 
occasional expression could be replaced by a fixed, objective expression which would 
refer to its object without any regard for the expressive act and the utterance context. 
But this is yet to be demonstrated and Husserl’s argument is broadly insufficient.15As 
for the second case of expressions, it is clear that signification, what is said as such, i.e. 
the signification that literally results from the syntax and the sheer sense plus reference 
of the words involved, is, in many instances, still insufficient to make up the complete 
meaning of a sentence.  Here is one of many examples: the expression it’s a beautiful 
day can express a statement of fact, a feeling of joy, it can mean ironically the opposite, 
it can serve to blatantly change the subject in a conversation, it can be a way of inform-
ing the interlocutor or inviting him or her for a walk, etc., so much so that its full mean-
ing (that is, what is said, plus what is meant by it) is only determinable by referring the 
literal meaning back to the respective communicational context and bearing in mind the 
type of communicative move that is being performed through that expression. 
To circumvent this situation, Husserl once again sustains his argument at the ex-
pense of an impoverishment of the concept of communication and a hypertrophy of the 
meaning function. In the Investigations, to communicate is simply the fact that thinking 
acts which occur in a subject are simultaneously made known to someone through the 
intimating function of linguistic signs. That is, to communicate is tantamount to dupli-
cating the same thoughts in a speaker and a listener. On the other hand, Husserl starts 
from the assumption that all thought is always codable and linguistically expressible, 
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 See L.U. Hua XIX/1, pp 83 et seq. 
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 He himself so admits in the second 1913 edition, in L.U   
15
 It is developed as a pure theoretical argument, based on the assumption of a supposed »absence of lim-
its to objective reason« (Schrankenlosigkeit der objektiven Vernunft). See L.U. Hua XIX/1, pp 95 et seq. 
(See also the suppressed passage, in the second 1913 edition, on the fixed and objective determinations of 
place and time which engaged Husserl to a non-relational conception of space and time.) 
with increasing levels of explicitness until one would ideally get to the limit-point at 
which the literal meaning would perfectly coincide with the intended meaning, so that 
regard to the communicational context would, therefore, become unnecessary (we will 
come back to this idea). 
The privilege granted to the declarative sentence also hinges on this, and is abso-
lutely consistent with this double Husserlian argument about (i) the ideal suppression of 
occasionality and (ii) the possible coincidence between the literal and intended mean-
ings in a non-abbreviate linguistic expression (full explicitness). A sentence like I think 
it’s a lovely day! would be replaceable by a long declarative sentence which, at most, 
would express the full meaning in the form John says that he thinks that it is a lovely 
day, to mean by that to his interlocutor Paul that… etc. 
 
C – The third assumption is that the essential function of language is to state. This 
is the assumption that definitely confers a prominent position on the truth-value dimen-
sion of speech and, consequently, confers a privileged status on declarative sentences. 
This happens because the declarative sentence (Aussagesatz) is characterised as saying 
something about something, as a λέγειν τι κατὰ τινός: »Any expression not only means 
something, but also says something about something; it not only has its signification but 
also refers to any objects«.16 It is to the extent that the basic dimension of language is 
this stating something about something, that the truth (or falsehood) of what is stated 
acquires the prominence that is commonly attributed to it. 
The fundamental distinction that is established in this characterisation of the es-
sential function of language is between the thing about which something is said and 
what is said about this thing. In modern nomenclature, one distinguishes between signi-
fying »content« and objective »reference«. Husserl calls these two dimensions of the 
declarative sentence, respectively, Bedeutung (meaning, signification) and gegen-
ständliche Beziehung (objective reference) of an Ausdruck (expression). It is usual to 
say that, through content (Inhalt), language refers to an »extra-mental« object.  But this, 
in Husserl’s semantics, is a grossly incorrect assertion. For one, the Bedeutung is al-
ready an extra-mental, supra-subjective, ideal, unreal object (as it was Sinn for Frege). 
Then, »object« is an ontological-formal, rather than ontological-material category: the 
object can either be extra-mental or intra-mental, linguistic or non-linguistic, it can be a 
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number, a physical being, a historical fact, a word, a lived-experience or anything else, 
because »object« is a category of formal ontology which can cover any entities whatso-
ever. The essential, in language, is rather the capacity to establish this duality between 
the object such as it is referred by a signification and the object that is referred by a sig-
nification.17 The difference between both is given by a logical-semantic operation that 
consists of submitting various signifying expressions to an identification synthesis, in 
such a way as to release awareness that what is intended in signification A and what is 
intended in signification B are the same thing – that, for example, Hera’s husband and 
the God of Lightning are the same mythological character, or that a < b or b > a refer to 
the same quantitative situation. It is this awareness of an identical variously referred to 
by several significations that prepares the consciousness of one object.18 Ideas I will, 
consequently, distinguish the Gegenstand im Wie, the object in the how, as predicate-
noema, and the Gegenstand schlechthin, the pure and simple object or the X, as a central 
sense-element of the noematic core. 
A fundamental intuition in the Investigations is that language gives substance to 
this ontological-formal distinction between object predicated (object pure and simple) 
and predicate object (object in the how) when it produces the distinction between what 
is said about something and the thing itself about which something is said. This distinc-
tion is based on the structure of the intentional consciousness – to envisage an object 
through a meaning (Sinn). To the extent that language gives substance to intentionality, 
its fundamental dimension will be precisely this power to articulate the logical differen-
tiations of the object consciousness. More important than what language says about 
things is the fact that it express this duality between object (about which one states – the 
Gegenstandworüber) and its determination (what is predicate of it), a duality that is al-
ready the fundamental distinction of the Pure Logical Grammar between primitive 
forms of signification: nominal representation, predicate representation and their com-
bination into a proposition (Satz).19 In short, intentionality is consciousness of an object 
through content, and language, to the extent that it »clothes« the intentional conscious-
ness, will have its essential core in the assertive structure of the declarative sentence. 
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III. … towards an implausible theory 
 
We can now examine more closely Husserlian theory about non-declarative sen-
tences, appraise its coherence, but also expose its phenomenological inaccuracy and 
even implausibility. 
To go straight to the essential, it amounts, first, to the following assumptions: 
1. Only those acts of objectifying quality (»thetic acts«) are meaning-carriers; 
2. The expression of an objectifying act, linked to a propositional matter (i.e. a 
»judgment«), is the declarative sentence which says something about something; 
3. The declarative sentence states something independently of the intuitive func-
tion (of knowledge) and the intimating function (of communication). 
Secondly, to the following constatative claim: 
It seems that interrogative, imperative, volitive and wish sentences, etc., are not 
declarative sentences and do not express objectifying acts (of belief) but rather acts of a 
different type, such as the question, the order, the will, the desire, etc. 
From which it follows that: 
a) Either these sentences are, as such, signifying; 
b) Or they borrow their signifying power from declarative sentences and 
objectifying acts. 
If a) were true, we would have the »Aristotelian« theory that any kind of sentence 
can carry meaning and questions, orders, etc. are irreducible to declarative sentences. 
We would have, therefore, the theory according to which λόγος σηµαντικός (the signi-
fying speech) is not exclusive to ἀpiόφασις (of the declaration or statement, the declara-
tive sentence), albeit only this can be true or false. But this theory is incompatible with 
1, 2 and 3 above. 
Thus, in the first place, between the declarative sentences and all other sentences 
there must be an essential difference: to paraphrase Mohanty,20 they will not just be 
different types of sentences, but will be different as sentences. The genus »sentence« is 
not truly a genus. Sentences that have a meaning by themselves are declarative sen-
tences. Secondly, from this it ensues that all others will not only be different as sen-
tences, but will only have a meaning insofar as questions, orders, etc. can be reduced to 
declarative sentences of a given type. In short, either non-declarative sentences are irre-
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ducible to declarative sentences and have independent meaning or they do not have in-
dependent meaning and have to be reduced to declarative sentences. Husserl’s assump-
tions only leave the second option open to him. 
Hence the task: it must be proved (i) that declarative sentences have a logical-se-
mantic behaviour that is different from all others, and that (ii) non-declarative sentences 
contain declarative sentences that are the true carriers of meaning. 
The final chapter of the Sixth Investigation addresses the task of demonstrating 
these two tenets. 
With regard to (i), Husserl uses an apparently convincing argument. Based on his 
own statements but going, a little further, we could define the notion of a complete sig-
nifying content as follows: 
So that a sentence f has a complete signifying content C, it must be possible to ex-
amine f both in terms of the adequacy of this content C to the object that it talks about 
and in terms of the adequacy of this content to the subject that is expressing him or her-
self, and the latter, both from the point of view of appropriateness of the words chosen 
(to express thought well or poorly) and from the point of view of the sincerity of his or 
her speech (to convey what he or she actually thinks). Therefore, for any sentence there 
will always be an objection or reply (Husserl’s word is »Einwand«) about truth, another 
about suitability and another about veracity. Where these three responses are not possi-
ble, C is not complete. 
In short, if C is complete, then f must be able to be true or false, proper or im-
proper, truthful or untruthful, each of these three pairs of values being irrespective of the 
other two (for example, a sentence can be untruthful but true and proper, or false but 
truthful and proper, etc.) 
If we now look at sentences like: 
 
F1 – The cat is on the mat; 
F2 – Is the cat on the mat? 
F3 – Put the cat on the mat! 
 
we observe a different logical-semantic behaviour which places F1 on one side and the 
F2-F3 pair on the other. Indeed, as is evident, the question and the order admit the 
proper subjective responses (suitability and veracity) whereas the objective reply about 
truth cannot apply (despite Bolzano’s argument21) – the question and the order, as such, 
are neither true nor false, because they lack the assertive dimension of stating something 
about something. Insofar as only F1 admits the objective and subjective responses (truth 
and suitability/veracity), only C1 is a complete signifying content. 
This takes us to Husserl’s second argument, designed to prove part (ii) of his the-
sis, i.e. the reducibility of F2 and F3 to declarative sentences. In fact, F2 and F3 only 
take on a complete content when they are rewritten in the form: 
 
F2’ – I ask if the cat is on the mat; 
F3’ – I order the cat to be put on the mat. 
 
Actually, when F1 and F2 are rewritten so, then they acquire a complete 
signifying content, because now the objective response can be made – the sentences are, 
in fact, true to the extent that, by naming them, they refer to the subjective lived-
experiences of asking and ordering and state their existence (they would be false if the 
person who utters were not, in fact, in any of these psychological states). Therefore, in 
the normal case, F2’ is true because it declares the existence of a subjective lived-ex-
perience that occurs simultaneously with the phrase that describes and names it.22 
Thus, for every f with a given force * (interrogative, exclamative, promissive, 
etc.), X being the subject that utters f, we could say that: 
 
R1. f* ↔ X* f 
 
i.e. a sentence with a given force, stated by a given subject, is equivalent to a description 
of a psychic state of this same subject, in which the force of the sentence morphs into a 
description of the quality of the corresponding act (e.g. the interrogative force of the 
sentence will correspond to the psychic lived-experience of the interrogation, etc.) 
The object signified by these sentences is, therefore, an object of a peculiar type. 
In fact, in general, f does not speak directly about the asked, expected, ordered, etc. ob-
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jects, but rather about the corresponding lived-experiences of asking, expecting, order-
ing, and its function consists precisely in expressing these subjective lived-experiences. 
»Is there life on Mars?« morphs into »I wonder if there is life on Mars«, which really 
says that »there is in me a psychic lived-experience of wondering, which is about the 
life on Mars«. 
To the natural objection that, if this doctrine were true, the judgment F1 could also 
be rewritten in the form: 
 
F1’ – I believe that the cat is on the mat; 
 
which would involve a regressus ad infinitum, as one could carry on: 
 
F1’’ – I believe that I believe that the cat is on the mat, etc., 
 
Husserl replies, and rightly so, that the situation is entirely different because F1 can be 
false and F1’ true, or inversely, whereas this does not happen with F2-F2’ and F3-F3’. 
This proves, in fact, that F1 and F1’ are not equivalent but rather two different judg-
ments, with possible distinct truth-values, while, in the case of the other pairs F2-F2’ 
and F3-F3’, it is the same sentence, and we are considering the relationship between the 
occasionally abbreviated sentence, determined by the communicative context of utter-
ance, and the complete sentence, without no occasional abbreviations (if we disregard 
the occasional expression »I«). 
This counter-objection is correct. It should also be added that, from the sentence 
 
F2 – Is the cat on the mat? 
 
one goes, unlike F1, through a relationship of equivalence, to 
 
F2’ – I ask if the cat is on the mat 
 
and also that, unlike F1’, this does not imply a regression to infinity in the form: 
 
F2’’ – I ask if I ask if the cat is on the mat, 
 
because F2’ declares that I ask, whereas F2’’ asks if I ask, which is not implicitly con-
tained in F2’ and cannot, therefore, be extracted from it by a supposed operation of ex-
plicitation. 
This then – in brief and skipping over the terrible details that abound in the 
chapter – is Husserl’s theory about non-declarative sentences and non-objectifying acts. 
Its main characteristics are as follows: 
1. Expressions for orders, questions, wishes, etc. are occasionally abbreviated 
formulae, within a communicational context, for declarative sentences and for objecti-
fying acts of a peculiar type. Thus, to ask »is S p?« is equivalent to declaring »I ask if S 
is p«. 
2. The objectifying act consists of asserting the existence of a psychic lived-ex-
perience perceived internally (a wish, a feeling, an order, a question), in such a way that 
it is this inner perception that is truly the meaning-carrier objectifying act in the de-
clarative sentence »I ask if S is p«. It is, certainly, a judgment of a very peculiar type, 
albeit still a judgment. 
3. The objectifying act of inner perception has the same relationship with the per-
ceived wish, question or order as the intention that intends an object has with the intui-
tion that fulfils this intention, in such a way that what happens here is, mutatis mutandis, 
the same as in the judgment: the judgement stands to the corresponding state of affairs, 
that is its object, like the sentence »I wish that…« to the concrete wish as a psychic 
lived-experience: the concrete wishful lived-experience is not the wish sentence itself, 
but rather the object of this sentence. We must not put together the judgment and the 
wish, but rather the state of affairs intended by the judgment and the wish. 
4. These sentences simultaneously fulfil three functions: (a) they mean something 
(namely, that a given subjective lived-experience is taking place here and now, for ex-
ample, a wish or an order), (b) they produce the fulfilment of this signifying intention by 
the corresponding intuition (since they are accompanied by the inner intuition of the 
wish itself or the order) and (c) they intimate something to somebody (to the extent that 
they make known to another the existence of this wish or this order).  The second and 
third functions (knowledge and communication) do not belong to the signifying func-
tion and are not, therefore, essential to the content of the sentence, although, by force of 
the orientation of the objectifying act towards inner, and not external, perception, the 
intention that is directed to a wish or an order and asserts its existence is always accom-
panied by the living intuition of the order or the wish itself, hence, by the fulfilment of 
the signifying intention. However, Husserl’s views lead us to conclude that the intimat-
ing function, associated with communication, can always be freely suppressed. That is, 
as with judgments, the occurrence of wishes, but also orders, questions, promises is pos-
sible outside any communicational space – we can wish, ask, promise or order im 
einsamen Seelenleben.23 
We can thus establish some general rules concerning the logical-semantic behav-
iour of non-declarative and declarative sentences. Firstly, there is the convertibility rule, 
by which a sentence with any force * (even belief) can be converted into a declarative 
sentence having as its object the lived-experience of the very subject that utters it. 
Along these lines, the declarative sentence being marked by straight brackets, we 
would have: 
 
R2. f* ↔ [X* f] 
 
Symmetrically, we would have the inconvertibility rule for declarative sentences, 
which could be formulated as follows: 
 
R3. ~ ( [f] ↔ [X* f] ) 
 
To be explicit: I believe that p does not follow from p, nor does p follow from I 
believe that p: either one can be true and the other false.24 
This is, for Husserl, and in line with his assumptions, how non-declarative sen-
tences are only signifying insofar as they contain, and are convertible into, declarative 
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IV. Two lessons by Austin 
 
But – as I have said – the coherence of the doctrine goes hand in hand with its to-
tal implausibility. This doctrine means that asking is equivalent to stating that one asks, 
that ordering is equivalent to stating that one orders and that, actually, when we ask or 
order or promise, we are focused not in another subject within a communicational con-
text, but in our own internally perceived lived-experiences, that we objectify them and 
that it is really about them that we are talking about. This is what makes the doctrine 
phenomenologically implausible and inaccurate. 
But inaccurate why, exactly? Husserl, like no-one else, is capable of a sharp phe-
nomenological analysis. The problem lies in knowing whether the conceptual apparatus 
that frames his analyses is suitable for the description. Driven by the programme of pure 
logic, in the wake of Gotlob Frege's decisive work (who »woke« him up from his »psy-
chologist dream«, so to speak...), Husserl's concepts make him the victim of various 
delusions that end up by falsifying the meaning content of the phenomenon in question. 
It is to exorcise these ghosts that we must pay attention to the lessons by John Austin, 
himself an expert on, and translator of, Frege,25 who knew how to find the concepts 
capable of accounting for a whole dimension of language that putting the focus only on 
pure logic obscures to the point of complete invisibility. 
Here is the first recalcitrant delusion that Austin exorcises: that declarative sen-
tences are always the expression of statements. In fact, a declarative sentence is not just 
and always the stating of something about something, i.e. a statement describing a real-
ity and adjusting or not to it. This is the descriptive delusion: there is, so to speak, a re-
ality preceding language that describes it, and the fundamental value of language is pro-
ducing sentences that are adjusted to this pre-existing reality. We can make this rela-
tionship more sophisticated and state that, behind a constative act, in the mundane use 
of language, there is a constitutive act, on the transcendental plane, that makes the for-
mer possible. However, this really changes nothing in the fundamental insight. 
Right at the beginning of How to do Things with Words, Austin places his reader 
before a totally different use of declarative sentences. When one says: 
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F4 – The session is open, 
 
this declarative sentence may actually serve to describe a fact: that the session is open. 
But, if uttered by whoever opens the session, this sentence does not describe a reality, 
but establishes the very reality that it names: the session is opened by the force of the 
sentence »the session is open« having been uttered. The same is true for expressions 
such as: 
 
F5 – I baptise thee in the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost 
F6 – I offer you my congratulations 
F7 – I declare you husband and wife 
F8 – X is the winner 
 
All these expressions have the same characteristics: firstly, they are unquestiona-
bly declarative sentences; secondly, they do not describe, however, an independent re-
ality and are consequently neither true nor false; thirdly, they instate or establish the 
very reality that they name, i.e. they serve to do things, not to describe facts – to con-
gratulate is to say »I congratulate you«, to open the session is to utter the sentence »the 
session is open« and so forth. Austin’s great discovery is that language can be, under 
certain circumstances – and also in certain cases, dependant on extra-linguistic social 
conventions (as in baptising, opening sessions, getting married, declaring a winner, etc.) 
– a means to perform an act. Hence, his famous division of declarative sentences into 
constative and performative. 
The second idol exorcised by Austin is the following: the idea that the meaning of 
a sentence is, or could ideally be, strictly and fully contained in the syntax and the se-
mantics of the words making up that sentence. Developing the Fregean concept of force 
(Kraft), Austin distinguishes between the locutionary and illocutionary components of a 
speech act. The locutionary dimension concerns the purely linguistic meaning of a 
speech act, for example, »the cat is on the mat« – this broadly corresponds to what is 
said in a sentence. But what is meant by that, namely whether one is stating that the cat 
is on the mat or asking if the cat is on the mat or exclaiming admiringly that the cat is on 
the mat, or even warning, predicting, etc., it pertains to what Austin calls the »illocu-
tionary force« of the speech act. 
In the final part of How to do Things with Words, John Austin criticises his initial 
distinction between constative and performative and states that »the doctrine on the per-
formative/constative distinction stands to the doctrine on locutionary and illocutionary 
acts, in the total speech act, as the special theory is to the general theory.«26 That is, 
John Austin ends up, towards the end of his work and in the light of the distinction be-
tween locutionary and illocutionary (as well as perlocutionary) acts, by realizing that the 
declarative sentence with assertive illocutionary force 
 
F1 – The cat is on the mat 
 
is also no more than a performative that effects, for the utterance itself, a speech act 
whose illocutionary force consists of stating, based on the rheme »the cat is on the 
mat«. Thus, the initial opposition comes apart. All sentences have a performative 
element since they all serve to institute the very reality of the speech act that they 
denote. The only difference between them is that this element can be implicitly or 
explicitly asserted in a prefix that precedes the locutionary part of the act.27 Therefore, 
Austin believes that the difference between: 
 
F1 – The cat is on the mat and 
F1’ – I state that the cat is on the mat 
F2 – Is the cat is on the mat? and 
F2’ – I ask if the cat is on the mat 
F9 – Good luck! and 
F9’ – I wish you good luck, 
 
lies in the illocutionary force of the speech act being or not being explicitly named. 
It is this analysis of the speech act that sheds a decisive light on the least satisfac-
tory aspects of the Husserlian arguments. From the start, Husserl is certainly right in 
establishing that: 
 
F3 – Put the cat on the mat! 
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 is equivalent to: 
 
F3’ – I order that you put the cat on the mat. 
 
However, unlike his argument, F3’ is not a declarative sentence with assertive 
force, but an order, in the form of an explicit performative, and does not contain, there-
fore, any statement or any »act of an objectifying quality«. In brief, F3’, of which F3 is 
an abbreviation, does not originate in an act of inner perception that makes lived-experi-
ences themselves objective (although certainly there is an act of non-objectifying, pre-
reflexive inner perception). F3’ is rather a form of intersubjective address within a 
communicational context. Such is the double failure of Husserl’s analyses – firstly, the 
false doctrine that all declarative sentences have assertive force and that the expressions 
of non-objectifying acts amount to declarative sentences and, therefore, to statements; 
secondly, that these supposed statements are about personal lived-experiences, reflex-
ively captured in an act of inner perception. Besides that, the whole Husserlian theory is 
ambiguous because, on the one hand, the founding theorem states that non-objectifying 
acts are based on objectifying acts, while his analysis of non-declarative sentences im-
plies that non-objectifying acts contain objectifying acts of a particular type. »To con-
tain« and »to be founded« are two different things. Husserl’s arguments do not fit each 
other. But their essential problem is that neither are these sentences statements nor are 
asking, promising, wishing good luck, congratulating, etc. reflexive objectivations of 
the lived-experiences themselves, but rather forms of social acts within a communica-
tional context. Husserl’s analysis is certainly valid for all kinds of wishes, volitions and 
feelings. Here, in fact, to say »I wish to visit the Himalayas« means to express a psychic 
wishful lived-experience through an act of inner perception. But it fails when the wish is 
a social act, like in the expression »I wish you good luck«. Here, the point is not re-
counting a inner psychic event but auspiciously addressing the other: to wish good luck 
is to utter before and for the other the phrase »I wish you good luck«. And, if the 
Husserlian analysis already fails in the case of these social greeting formulae, in the 
case of questions, orders, promises, warnings and others, which are manifestly forms of 
intersubjective connection, then it becomes completely inaccurate. If »non-objectifying 
acts« lack a suitable phenomenological analysis, and they certainly do, the right context 
for this analysis is not pure logic and the privilege of the ideal-identical Bedeutung, but 
the meaning structures of the communicative act and the communicational space. 
 
 
V. What is to communicate? 
 
If we follow in the wake of the phenomenon of communication, two things, not 
very obvious at first, will increasingly prevail as we continue our analysis: firstly, the 
communicative phenomenon does not have to be necessarily linguistic or even be sup-
ported by some convention-established code (some non-natural »language«); secondly, 
what Husserl, in terms of linguistic communication, calls the intimating function 
(kundgebende Funktion) – which is the fact that expressions (Ausdrücke), as signifying 
signs, insofar as they are used in utterance acts (Äusserungen), also function as indica-
tive signs of the lived-experiences of that who utters, when they are grasped by another 
– is not, by itself, communication (Mitteilung). 
In short, it is important to be aware that (i) the roots of the communication phe-
nomenon should be sought at the pre-linguistic level – communication »begins« before 
and outside language, and there is even communication without language; (ii) the 
structure that Husserl puts forward at the language level (expressive signs functioning 
as indicative signs) is not, by itself, a sufficient condition to enable us to speak about 
communication. And a third point is also essential: without the pre-linguistic structures 
of communication there would not be communication at the level of language, so that 
pre-linguistic structures do not only exist before but also impregnate linguistic commu-
nication as a whole. 
To show this requires a description of the phenomenon-communication. The iden-
tification of the phenomenon to which the concept of communication is applied is not 
arbitrary. It is guided by the pre-conceptual understanding we have about what is a case 
of effective communication. If we appeal to this prior understanding, it allows us to ex-
clude several things, in particular: 
a) The simple awareness of the existence of another subject, present or simply rep-
resented; 
b) The simple transmission and reproduction of information, through the comple-
mentary processes of encoding and decoding, in a linguistic form or otherwise. 
In brief: on the one hand, a theory of Einfühlung, of empathy, is not yet a theory of 
communication – clearly, we can be aware of another, realise what »is going on with 
him«, that, for example, he is running hurriedly, he has certain thoughts, certain emo-
tions and intentions, we can »see« all this, but without entering into a communicative 
relationship with him. This is why a simple theory of intersubjectivity in line with what 
Husserl develops in Cartesianische Meditationen or what Sartre develops in L'être et le 
néant (the analysis of the regard) is not yet a theory of communication; secondly, a the-
ory of information transmission and reception through a channel of some kind is not yet 
a theory of communication either – the mere presence of the same content in a trans-
mitter and a receiver, in line with Shannon and Weaver’s cybernetic concept of commu-
nication,28 not yet a case of communication between both, as happens when, for exam-
ple, by writing these lines, it turns out that another person accidentally reads them and is 
therefore aware of my thoughts, without, however, my having had a communicative 
intention in the strict sense with them. We will have the same content – but we have not 
communicated. 
Which phenomenon are we looking at when we talk about communication? Not 
just at the behaviour of another, given to me in the apperception by empathy (what he 
thinks, what he does, etc.); not only at the way I react in myself to the behaviour of an-
other (if I am touched, bored, enthusiastic, enraged, etc. by what he does); but rather at 
the behaviour of another insofar as it is addressed to me, insofar as we both know that 
this behaviour is addressed to me, and I react to it and we both know that this reaction is 
an appropriate response to this behaviour that was addressed to me. An example: if I see 
Louis turn to look at the door and stare at it, I can conclude that he is interested in what 
is happening there and become interested too, to the point of looking; but if I see that 
Louis turns his eyes toward the door ostensibly so that I see him doing it, then I infer 
that it is for me that he is making the gesture and that it is me that he wants to inform 
that something is happening, that, say, the person I was afraid of, or was expecting or 
was longing for, etc. is arriving. 
It is in cases like this that, according to our pre-conceptual understanding, we are 
facing an actual phenomenon of communication. It involves: 
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1. A vocative intention – addressing someone, i.e., constituting one person as an-
other subject in an interlocution situation – and the reception of the vocative intention. 
2. An informative intention (in the broadest sense), performed by the presentation 
of content (which may be a behaviour, a gesture, a word, etc.) with the intention of elic-
iting a relevant reply by the interlocutor. 
3. A replicative intention by the addressee, expressly determined by the informa-
tive content, that is relevant, clear and capable of inducing a new »move« from 2. 
4. The mutually manifest nature, for all parties, of the vocative, informative and 
replicative intentions, and good understanding of their meaning. 
Obviously, in this scheme, the vocative intention, in 1, is the specific element of 
the phenomenon of communication. Communication is always directed. The addressee 
can be either singular or plural, definite or indefinite. For example, at present, it is not 
only true that I express these thoughts, but also that I intend to communicate them to 
anyone who is interested in them, and all those who hear them or read them are aware of 
this intention. As for 2, the informative intention, what is relevant is not that it can be of 
any kind, verbal or non-verbal, but that it can appeal to both inference processes and 
decoding processes, and both simultaneously, and that it is more fundamental to call for 
inference than decoding processes (of which language is just one case). Thus, in the 
example above, when Louis looks at me and stares at the door ostensibly so that I also 
look at it, this is the vocative intention – he »calls me«, appeals to me as an interlocutor. 
At the same time, the vocative intention is a meta-intention that goes hand-in-hand with 
the informative intention – the message sent (i.e. that the person I am interested in is 
entering) is not encoded, but results from an inference of mine, based on the things that 
we share and that we both know. As for 4, the manifest nature of the various intentions 
for all interlocutors is obviously a necessary condition for communication. But the 
question of »good comprehension« has a deeper and more decisive lesson. It is this: 
communication can only be effected on the basis of a common world (a Gemeinwelt), 
known by all, which is always expanding with each successive communicative move. 
This common world can start by being the sharing of the same perceived surrounding 
world, but must involve other strata, in particular, common knowledge of facts, beliefs, 
assumptions, etc. 
Going back to our initial theme, and to conclude, let us then apply this communi-
cative structure to the case of non-declarative sentences and non-objectifying acts. I will 
address only two aspects that I believe are essential. 
First of all, and contrary to the beliefs of Husserl, desires, emotions and other re-
lated things do not fall under the same genus as questions, orders, promises and other 
similar acts. There is a crucial distinction. Judgments referring to states-of-affairs, 
whether external or internal, are one thing. For example, Earth is the third planet in the 
solar system, I would like to visit the Himalayas, I am angry, etc. In all these judgments 
(which need not all be predicative judgments), an objectifying act refers to an objective 
situation whose existence is independent of the fact of being referred to or not in the 
corresponding judgment – Earth, my wish, my rage.  In all cases, the judgement de-
scribes accurately or not the state-of-affairs, it is true or false. And the act of judging is 
complete without the communicative function – it does not need to appear to another. 
Against this, phrases like I wonder if the keys are in your pocket, go and get the 
keys, I promise you I will give you the keys, I wish you luck in the new house, I ask your 
forgiveness for not yet having come to the new house, are phrases of an entirely different 
nature. They are neither true nor false, contrary to Husserl's tendency to consider them 
declarative sentences of a particular kind. Nevertheless, they do have what we might 
call conditions for success. For a promise to promise, a question to ask or an order to 
order, it must be externalised, that is, it must appear, and be received as such by an in-
terlocutor. In short, the vocative intention must be fulfilled by its reception by the in-
terlocutor, and the informative intention must be well understood and appropriately an-
swered. Austin called this the uptake. Adolf Reinach said that such acts are verneh-
mungsbedürftig – they need to be heard in order to succeed. In general, any act that 
needs these conditions to be successful (to appear, vocative and informative intentions 
received by another) is a social act: he or she that receives is, by the act itself, bound as 
a person who is asked, as a subordinate who is ordered, as a recipient of a promise, etc. 
The phenomenon of communication is therefore interconnected with the phenomenon of 
sociability. 
Therefore, we divide acts into acts requiring and not requiring externalisation and 
reception to be successful. The first are social acts. The second are not. The clearest 
example of the second is the judgment in a monological context, which is fulfilled in the 
corresponding intuition. As for the former, it is now clear that the simple function of 
expression, as Husserl presents it in the First Investigation, is still unable to put this in-
tricate structure of the communicative act forward: to communicate is not only the fact 
that someone else knows what I am thinking (maybe that is not even a case of commu-
nication, if he has »read« them in my involuntary gestures, if he has overheard me with-
out me wanting him to, and so on). 
The second – and last – characteristic that I want to stress is the following: verbal 
communication is broadly inferential and can never codify everything that is communi-
cated. Husserl’s great idea, on the contrary, is that the fundamental structure of language 
is given by the duplicity of meaning and the object referred to by that meaning, and that 
understanding the signification and identifying its object is neither dependent on, nor 
relative to the respective contexts of utterance. The meaning determines the reference, 
without, at least ideally, it being necessary to refer to the speaker or the circumstances 
of his speech – this is one of the central tenets of both Husserlian and Fregean seman-
tics. 
So, one of the results of our reflections on communication is that it is effected 
within the framework of a Gemeinwelt, i.e. within the framework not only of a common 
world, but of a common world mutually known as common. From the start, any sen-
tence only makes complete sense and only finds the reference object through putting its 
meaning to the test of the respective common world of a community of interlocutors. In 
the years after the Investigations, Husserl realised that all empirical meaning triggers an 
occasional context. 
Let us look one last time at the sentence that has been occupying us: the cat is on 
the mat. Can we indeed say that this phrase has an »absolute« meaning and reference, 
regardless of any context? Let us limit ourselves to the reference. What cat? Let us say 
that this is the cat that Austin had in mind when he wrote the sentence? (Which Austin?) 
But using this definite description – »the cat Austin had in mind« – already concedes 
that the reference is found through putting the meaning to the test of the objects of a 
communicative community. And if we wanted to find it through the pure semantics of 
the sentence, we should do the following: 
(1) Eliminate the pre-linguistic reference to a present world M@ perceptively 
given; 
(2) Eliminate the reference to a world of objects shared by each of the communi-
cative communities in which we participate; 
(3) Make the sentence itself grow, so as to add to it explicitly all that is implicitly 
involved in its interpretation by means of (1) and (2). 
We would therefore have to say expressly, without using any occasional expres-
sions like »this«, »today«, »last year« or even proper names like »Austin«, what cat it 
is, what mat, in which house, when, and even, after all this, we would always face a last 
and final problem, which is in fact the biggest problem: because we no longer assume a 
common perceptive world that the language refers to as its M@, because we have only 
pure sentences with their meaning and their reference to objects from any possible 
worlds, since we only have the verbum without a world already given in advance, we 
would then have to determine, in a purely semantic way, from all possible worlds, 
which concrete world is referred to by the expressions we are using. 
Regarding this »semantic« full determination, I assert that to isolate one and only 
one world as a global correlate of the sentences of a language is only possible through 
all the sentences that describe the objects of this world. But this is something that im-
plies the idea of a determinate whole whose formation rule we can define, but we cannot 
attain in any finite progression of successive steps. So no finite series of sentences can 
define one and only one reference world, because there will always be an infinite num-
ber of identical finite series, which are differentiated only in the following steps and 
refer, therefore, to different possible worlds. 
Indeed, it is arguable that, if two possible worlds, M1 and M2 are discernible, then 
there is, in the whole of all the true declarative sentences, F1 and F2, which describe 
them thoroughly, at least one sentence, f, that belongs to, say, F1 and not F2. In fact, if 
F1 were equal to F2, it would then follow that M1 would be equal to M2, since it would 
be indiscernible from it. Therefore if, by definition, they are different, then F1 and F2 
must also be different, because otherwise the worlds would be indiscernible. Thus, to 
determine, without previous context, the world that a sentence refers to involves all the 
declarative sentences of a language. 
You will say: »this long route is not necessary, because the sentences of a lan-
guage refer to the actual world of the utterance act.« But this is not a valid response. 
First, because a sentence uttered in the actual world M@ may be referring to an object 
from a possible world Mp, like when we talk of Pegasus or that I am in Australia right at 
this very moment. Second, because talking of the utterance act of the actual world is to 
give as resolved the issue of context, which was the problem to be solved. Therefore, it 
is clear that all references are made from the perceptive world that serves as a back-
ground to the use of language (our world), and in this world, to the domain of objects of 
a particular communicative community. The passage of meaning to reference takes the 
form of an inferential process from a context that is always given pre-linguistically, but 
which is fluid and ever-variable. When at home I speak of the mat, everyone knows that 
I refer to the doormat. When we talk here about the »Meditations«, everyone knows that 
we are referring to those of Husserl, not those of Descartes or to the exercises of Loyola. 
In essence, without putting the meaning of a sentence to the test of the context of a 
communicative community, its Gemeinwelt, or of a perceptive surrounding world, it 
would have to involve all the sentences in the language, to determine the world which 
applies to them as the actual world. An impossible operation that would condemn us to 
incommunicability. If language has meaning and can refer to objects, that already pre-
supposes a wide variety of structures, generated from perceptive, intersubjective and 
communicative experience, which forms for the community of speakers a single, com-
mon world. 
